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11. Introduction
The large volume of recent empirical studies on economic growth inspired 
by the new growth theory has been investigated mostly by using cross-country 
regressions, typically employing the Summers and Heston (1991) data and IMF 
data. There are two main issues in these cross-country analyses on economic 
growth, which provide further implications for explaining the sources of 
economic growth. First, the main concern is to verify the possibility of per 
capita income convergence among cross-countries. The Neoclassical growth 
models illustrates that the per capita growth rate tends to be inversely related to 
the initial level of output or income per person. If economies are similar with 
respect to preferences and technology, then poor economies grow faster than 
rich ones. Thus, there is a force which promotes convergence in levels of per 
capita income.(1) The second trend of cross-country analysis is to investigate the 
relationship between economic growth and macroeconomic policy indicators. It 
is widely accepted that a stable macroeconomic framework is necessary though 
not sufficient for sustainable growth. However, these cross-country studies could 
not provide a growth mechanism between economic growth and technological 
progress. Furthermore, none of the macroeconomic factor showed consistently 
robust relation with economic growth. 
Current cross-country analyses have indicated that all the possible macro-
economic factors including their policies could be considered as possible 
sources of economic growth. First, various measures of the level of financial 
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development are strongly associated with real per capita GDP growth (King 
and Levine, 1993). Second, macroeconomic indicators and policies (i.e., fiscal 
structure, government’s budget surplus or deficit, government’s investment in 
transport and communication, inflation rate, foreign exchange rate, and etc) 
are consistently correlated with growth [e.g., Easterly and Rebelo (1993), 
Fisher (1993), and Barro (1991)]. Third, the export growth and trade openness 
is crucial for explaining the differential in income growth [e.g., Feder (1983) 
and Dollar (1992)]. Fourth, human capital is strongly and positively associated 
with convergence in per capita income growth (Barro, 1991). Almost all 
macroeconomic variables are weak in relation to per capita output growth, 
however, there is robust correlation between growth and the share of investment 
in GDP (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Thus, those cross-country analyses could 
not answer which macroeconomic factors are consistently related to income 
growth and failed to find a growth mechanism between income growth and 
technological progress. Furthermore, these analyses did not challenge to clarify 
what kinds of growth mechanism is existing between technological progress and 
macroeconomic factors. In this context, only Fisher (1993) tried to find a growth 
mechanism between income growth and total factor productivity growth by 
using growth accounting method. 
The growth accounting method that decomposes output growth to 
three different parts (i.e., physical capital growth, labor input growth, and 
technological progress) is applied in order to calculate technological progress 
(i.e., Solow residual or total factor productivity growth). Neoclassical growth 
theory implies that the long-run growth can be achieved and continued by 
the exogenous technological progress. In addition, endogenous economic 
growth theory implies that technological progress has related with human 
capital, R&D activity, and international trade. In this context, cross-country 
analysis encounters serious problem of data limitation in calculating the rate of 
technological progress. However, these problems can be solved by using time-
series analysis of a country. The necessity of time series analysis for a country 
deserves to be another motivation of this study.(2) First of all, we cast doubts on 
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the results of cross-country analysis: whether or not these results conform well 
to those of time-series of single country. Secondly, there is little cross-country 
analysis, which investigates some linkages between technological growth 
and growth mechanism. Thus, the problem we have to pursue and solve is the 
sources of technological progress and the structure of growth mechanism. 
Based on these motivations and current different cross-country regression 
results, the objectives of this study are to identify a growth mechanism and the 
sources of technological progress of Korean manufacturing during 1974-1993. 
To compare with the results of cross-country analyses, we also employ all 
the possible macroeconomic indicators considered in previous cross-country 
analyses- fiscal, monetary and financial, and trade sectors. In this respect, it is 
highly interesting to investigate the role of macroeconomic indicators on the 
technological progress of Korean economy if we recognize its government 
nature in economic growth. From the early 1960s, Korean government actively 
intervened private economy by using fiscal and financial tools in order to 
achieve rapid economic growth. However, there are no cross-country studies 
investigating the relationship between R&D indicators and technological 
progress even though endogenous growth theory places a great importance of 
R&D activity in economic growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1993). We think 
that the source of technological progress must be closely related with human 
capital and R&D capital rather than other macroeconomic variables. As a new 
feature of this study, we employ a variety of R&D indicators to examine its 
relationship with technological progress. 
We use the econometric methodology of sensitivity analysis suggested 
by Levine and Renelt (1992). As Levine and Renelt indicated, we consider the 
relationship between technological progress and a particular variable of interest 
to be robust if it remains statistically significant and theoretically predicted 
sign when the conditioning set of variables in the regression changes. There are 
also several differences between Levine and Renelt (1992) and this study as 
follows. First, we employ the growth model of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) as 
the base regression equation. Second, we focus on manufacturing industry not 
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the whole economy. We choose manufacturing industry as our main concern 
because manufacturing industry has served as a main sector of economic 
growth and export growth. Another reason is that manufacturing sector can be 
easily separated from the effect of monetary and fiscal sector rather than whole 
economy. Third, small differences will be found on the composition of basic-
variables positioned in the right hand side of regression equation. Particular 
difference is employing the catch up term in our regression, which is required 
by Benhabib and Spiegel’s growth model (1994). Discrete descriptions will be 
shown in Section 3. 
The next section of the paper introduces the overview of Korean 
macroeconomic policies and economic growth during 1960s-1990s. The growth 
model, econometric methodology, and data used will be described in Section 
3. Our empirical investigation starts in Section 4, which uses macroeconomic 
policy indicators for the period 1974-1993. We summarize and conclude in 
Section 5. 
2. Overview of Korean Macro-economic Policy and Economic Growth
This section describes the brief features of Korean macro-economic policy 
and manufacturing growth during 1960-1993. Korea in the 1950s, with a per 
capita of less than $80 (nominal base) and more than two thirds of its population 
engaged in the primary sector, possessed all the familiar characteristics of an 
extremely underdeveloped economy. With the energetic execution of export-
oriented growth strategy since the early 1960s, however, the Korean economy 
expanded at an average annual rate of nearly 9 percent during 1960-1993. 
Nominal per capita GNP grew from $80 in 1960 to $7513 in 1993. Most of 
all, commodity exports rose from $33 million in 1960 to $82.2 billion in 1993. 
During this era of rapid economic growth, Korean economy encountered serious 
problems in its economic system. As a result of large part of investment financed 
by foreign savings, Korea gradually became a major indebted developing nation 
and its economy became vulnerable to external shocks. Furthermore, government’
s drive for heavy and chemical industry during the 1970s distorted resource 
4 5
allocation by discretionary credit allocation. In addition, the undesirable side effect of 
this policy invoked the concentration of economic power in large business group or 
chebols, as opposed to small and medium- sized companies.(3) Needless to say, Korean 
manufacturing became vulnerable to external shocks by this heavy debt ratio. We 
present more detailed descriptions about macroeconomic policies and manufacturing 
sector during 1960-1993. Table 1 reports the main indices of Korean macro-economic 
developments during the period 1974-1993. 
2.1 Export-led Growth Policy during 1961-72
After export-led growth (or government-led growth) strategy adopted in 
the early 1960s, Korean economy showed a successful transition to a newly 
industrializing economy from an agrarian economy in a relatively short period of 
time. In 1961, the new government of the Third Republic, headed by President 
Park Chung Hee, committed to growth first strategy through by export-led 
growth policy.(4) In the 1960s, the essence of this strategy was the promotion 
of labor-intensive manufacturing exports in which Korea had a comparative 
advantage. The government actively mobilized both policy tools of government 
and financial sectors to this end. The results of the comprehensive changes in 
Korea’s growth strategy and institutional structure transformed Korea into one 
of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Average annual growth of real 
GNP for the 1961-72 periods was more than double the 1954-60 average, with 
an average annual rate of 8.2 percent. Corbo and Suh (1992) indicated that the 
share of total investment financed by national savings rose from less than 25 
percent in 1962 to just under 61 percent in 1971, while the ratio of investment 
to GDP in current prices rose from 13 percent to 25 percent. The manufacturing 
sector increased its share of GDP from 13.6 percent in 1961 to 22.2 percent in 
1972, while the share of the agricultural, forestry, and fisheries sector decreased 
from 37 percent to 26.8 percent. Most of all, Korea’s rapid growth and structural 
change were largely the result of the surge in foreign trade. The ratio of total 
exports to GNP rose from 1.95 percent in 1961 to 15.9 in 1972, with an average 
growth rate of 27.8 percent. 
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2.2 Strong Drives for Heavy and Chemical Industries during 1973-1980
The development strategy of the 1970s was again characterized by 
continued government intervention. First of all, this period could be represented 
by government’s strong drives for heavy and chemical industries (HCI): 
development of new strategic industries and promotion of intermediate materials 
and capital goods. The motivation of these polices was that there was concern 
of losing Korea’s comparative advantage in light manufacturing industries 
compared with other developing countries and was to construct industrial 
structures toward higher value added products. In 1973, the government 
announced the heavy and chemical industry development plan, which favored 
such industries as shipbuilding, automobiles, steel products, nonferrous metals, 
and petrochemicals. Thus, expansionary fiscal and financial policies were 
directed to support this drive: better public services and administration, special 
tax incentives, preferential credit allocation, and negative real interest rates 
under a system of widespread credit rationing. In particular, a great effort was 
made to raise domestic savings, which fell far short of investment requirement. 
As a consequence, heavy foreign borrowing made up most of the shortage 
in the domestic saving. To make economies of scale possible in a limited 
domestic market, monopolistic production was permitted in a few industries. 
The administration also set up high protective barrier for these infant industries 
and maintained the protection until the industries became internationally 
competitive.(5) 
The expansionary financial and fiscal policies aggravated the condition of 
foreign debt, which financed a sharp increase in total absorption and a current 
account deficit: the ratio of foreign debt to GDP reached 38.9 percent during 
1973-1983. Nevertheless, Korean economy was left increasingly vulnerable to 
external shocks; this vulnerability was intensified by the government’s extensive 
financing and subsidy schemes for agriculture and by an industrial structure 
of great dependence on crude oil. As a consequence, expansionary economic 
policies for HCI provided undesirable side-effects to Korean economy: excess 
capacity appeared in the HCI, government deficit and foreign debt were 
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increasing, the financial sectors were accumulating non-performing loans, 
and these policies fostered the rapid growth of a few but large conglomerates, 
chebols. At the same time, an overheated labor market that caused real wages 
increases in manufacturing and export activities: an average annual rate of 
real wages was increased by 9.89 percent during 1974-1980. The overheated 
labor market and a sharp increase in total absorption followed by expansionary 
economic policies led to a high average annual inflation rate of 19.5 percent 
based on consumer price index during 1974-1980. Moreover, real effective 
exchange rate appreciated due to the domestic inflation: real effective exchange 
rate grew at an average annual rate of 0.4 percent during 1974-1983. Thus, it 
was clear that the rate of increase in wages and the appreciation of real effective 
exchange rate were outstripping the rise in productivity. Furthermore, the rise in 
wages and the lack of access to bank credit hit the profitability of labor-intensive 
exports particularly hard, and they rapidly lost competitiveness in the face of 
lower unit labor costs in other NICs.
2.3 Stabilization and Liberalization Policies during 1981-86
In the early 1980s, the Korean economy was characterized by very slow 
growth, rapidly expanding foreign debt, and high inflation. Despite its initial 
lack of success in 1979-80, the stabilization program did establish the basis for 
the reform efforts of the new government-Fifth Republic government (President 
Chun Doo-Hwan). In 1981 the reformers launched a development strategy 
directed toward achieving three related goals: (a) price stability, particularly for 
daily necessities; (b) market liberalization; and (c) balanced economic growth. 
Although the plan embodied the three areas of emphasis, price stabilization 
clearly took the highest priority. The plan was based on a package of restrictive 
monetary and fiscal measures that replaced the aggressive government spending 
of the late 1970s. In pursuit of price stability, the government introduced a 
series of tight monetary and fiscal measures to eliminate the destructive cycle of 
inflation. In 1983, public sector expenditures, which throughout the 1970s had 
been growing, resulting in a public sector deficit, were cut back sharply. In 1984, 
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the government went so far as to freeze its nominal spending at 1983 levels. As 
a result, the share of government expenditure in GDP declined from 14.5 percent 
during 1974-80 to 12.3 percent during 1981-1986. A further measure designed 
to stabilize prices was a steady reduction in the rice subsidy to farmers. As a 
result, the share of government deficit in GDP dropped from minus 3.0 percent 
during 1974-1980 to minus –2.0 percent during 1981-1986. Another important 
component of the stabilization program was income policy, which played an 
essential role in breaking the inflationary trend of the economy. By issuing 
suggested guidelines for wages increases and setting low scheduled raises for the 
salaries of its own employees, the government made strenuous efforts to keep 
nominal wage increases at reasonable levels. Wage dropped sharply from 9.89 
percent during 1974-80 to 5.5 percent during 1981-86. 
During 1981-86, the Korean economy recovered its rapid economic growth 
and better macroeconomic conditions by these reforms and policy directions. 
In light of the minus GDP growth in 1980, Per capita GDP grew at an average 
annual of 3.04 percent during 1981-86, which was greater than 2.30 percent 
during 1974-80. The most significant achievement, however, was the success 
in curbing inflation. Inflation rate declined sharply from 16.9 percent during 
1974-80 to 5.2 percent during 1981-1986. The success in curbing inflation and 
wage enhanced the international competitiveness in the export market. Real 
effective exchange rate depreciated considerably: the growth of real exchange 
rate declined from 0.4 percent during 1974-80 to minus 0.4 percent during 
1981-86. As a consequence, Exports increased from 25.1 percent during 1974-80 
to 28.9 percent during 1981-86 while imports showed stable pace of growth. 
In particular, Korean economy for the first time faced current account surplus 
in 1986: $4.2 billion of trade surplus accomplished. However, there exists still 
a large burden of foreign debt: Foreign debt increased to 47.1 percent during 
1981-86 from 38.9 percent during 1974-83. Although Korean policy and its 
implementation were clearly dominant factors in the successful adjustment of the 
1980s, it is also true that after 1982 Korea faced an increasing favorable external 
environment. World trade picked up once again, particularly in the United 
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States, commodity prices declined significantly, after 1983. The important point, 
however, is, that Korea took full advantage of these opportunities.
2.4 Deregulation and External Liberalization Policies during 1987-1993 
In 1986, Korean economy faced a new phase of growth by realizing high 
economic growth, stable prices, and a trade surplus. The broad policy direction 
of this period was to enhance the efficiency and strengthen the international 
competitiveness of Korean economy in general by reforming the free enterprise 
market system. Thus, the major contents of policy reforms included the drastic 
reduction of various government regulations constraining the growth of the 
enterprises plus extensive promotion of liberalization of finance, imports, and 
foreign exchange. Korea has been taking a gradual approach to opening market 
and to external liberalization. However, since 1983, the process has been more 
rapid, as the government has accelerated the liberalization of imports, foreign 
direct investment, current and capital accounts transactions, and the reduction 
of tariffs. The pace of import liberalization was further accelerated by the 
surplus of balance of payments in 1986. The nation decided to eliminate the 
import surveillance system, which was introduced in 1977 to monitor imports 
of newly liberalized items for special treatment. The system was abolished in 
1989. Furthermore, over 800 items restricted by 17 different special laws were 
liberalized as these laws were eliminated between 1987 and 1988 (Sakong, 
1993). From 1986, regulations on foreign exchange transactions were also 
gradually introduced and accelerated, when the nation recorded a balance of 
payments. Korea formally announced the acceptance of full obligations of 
International Monetary Fund Article VIII in November 1988. At the same time, 
it also decided to give up privileges of quantitative import restrictions justified 
under the GATT Article XVIII Section B, effective as of January 1990. The 
government also continuously liberalized markets for technological and foreign 
direct investment in the 1980s. In addition, market liberalization for services was 
introduced, and intellectual property rights were to be protected according to 
international conventions.  
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During 1987-1993, most of the macroeconomic indicators showed high 
economic growth, increasing trade surplus, and decreasing foreign debt with 
the exception of real wages and inflation. Per capita GDP continued to grow at 
an average annual rate of 3.07 percent with the increased investment shares in 
GDP. The share of trade surplus in GDP reached 1.5 percent during 1987-1993 
from minus 1.3 percent in 1981-1986. This trade surplus was made possible 
by the increase of exports while the decrease of imports: Imports declined 
largely to 25.8 percent during 1987-1993 from 30.2 percent during 1981-1986. 
However, there seemed to be an inflationary pressure on Korean economy, which 
showed different aspects as compared with those of the early 1980s. The share 
of government expenditure in GDP continued to reduce at 10.2 percent during 
1987-1993 from 12.3 percent during 1981-1986. At the same time, the growth 
of monetary and financial sectors sustained its stable pace during 1987-1993 
as compared with the period of 1981-1986. However, the booming economy 
and export growth overheated labor market: Unemployment declined from 4.1 
percent during 1981-1986 to 2.6 percent during 1987-1993. A phenomenon of 
bubble economy happened on land and stock prices. Furthermore, labor unions 
reacted to this bubble economy by demanding wages that exceeded productivity 
gains. As a consequence, wage increased rapidly from 5.52 percent during 
1981-1986 to 8.78 percent during 1987-1993. Inflation rate was 6.4 percent 
during 1987-1994 while it increased rapidly from 3.0 percent in 1987 to 9.3 
percent 1991.
3. Growth Model, Econometric Methodology, and Data
3.1 Growth Model
We employ the human capital growth model of Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994) as the basic model of our sensitivity analysis. This model represents 
that the level of human capital will affect directly the technological progress 
and indirectly with a catch up term. The model can be described as follows. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) assume a Cobb-Douglas technology, 
Yt =At (Ht )Kt  Lt , where per capita income, Yt , is dependent on two input 
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factors-labor, Yt and physical capital,Kt ,  and  represent factor shares, and 
the technological factor At (Ht ) is assumed as a function of human capital.(6) 
The standard growth accounting method further decomposes the relationship 
for long-term growth from time 0 to time T by taking log differences. The 
technological progress, total factor productivity growth, will be described as 
follows 
(1)
Furthermore, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) revised the growth of technology by 
considering the technological growth model of Nelson and Phelps (1966). They 
devised a model of technological growth composed of two factors: the level of 
human capital that account for domestic endogenous innovation and a catch-up 
term that account for foreign technological inflow.  
(2)
                                        
where Hi , Yi , and Ymax  indicate the level of human capital of country I, the per 
capita of country I, and the per capita income of leader country, respectively. 
Therefore, c, the coefficient of constant term, represents the exogenous 
technological progress, gHi represents endogenous technological progress 
associated with the ability of a country to innovate domestically, and mHi [(Ymax- 
Yi) /Yi]  represents the diffusion of technology from abroad. While the ‘domestic 
innovation progress’ term indicates that human capital stocks independently 
enhance technological progress, the ‘catch-up’ term suggests that holding human 
capital levels constant, countries with lower initial productivity levels will 
experience faster rates of growth of total factor productivity. 
Furthermore, we expand the model of Benhabib and Spiegel (1995) by 
including two factors, the growth of labor input and the ratio of investment to 
GDP, in order to compare our results with those of previous research (i.e., Levine 
and Renelt, 1992). These two factors have been employed in most of the growth 
regressions. Thus, the base equation of technological progress will be estimated 
as follows
(3)
log At (Ht )-log A0 (H0 )=(logYt -logY0 )-  (log Kt -log K0 )-  (logLt -log L0 ). 
[log At (Ht )-log A0 (Ht )]i = c + gHi + mHi [(Ymax-Yi ) / Yi ],
 = c + (g - m) Hi + mHi Ymax /Yi ,
[log At (Ht )-log A0 (Ht )]i = c + (g-m) Hi + mHi (Ymax/Yi ) + pINVt + sLABt ,
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where INV and LAB indicate the share of investment to GDP and the growth of 
labor input, respectively. These four numbers of variables in the right-hand side 
of equation (3) will become “basic variables” (termed I-variables) of sensitivity 
analysis in Section 4. In particular, it is one of our main interests to clarify the 
relationships between INV and TFP growth and between INV and per capita 
income growth. Levine and Renelt (1992) found that INV had a positive and 
robust relationship with per capita income growth.
3.2 The Econometric Methodology and Data used
We use a variant of extreme bound analysis (hereafter, sensitivity analysis) of 
Levine and Renelt (1992), which was firstly proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) 
and Leamer and Herman (1983). Levine and Renelt (1992) used sensitivity 
analysis in order to investigate whether there exists a robust or fragile 
relationship between per capita income growth and a variety of macro-economic 
variables, even in the changes of conditioned information set. We briefly show 
the methodology of sensitivity analysis suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992). 
We use a following equation for sensitivity analysis
(4)
where Y is income growth (or TFP growth), I is a set of variables always 
included in the regression, M is a variable of interest, and Z is a subset of 
variables chosen from a pool of variables identified by past studies as potentially 
important explanatory variables of growth. The sensitivity analysis involves 
varying the subset of Z-variables included in the regression to find the range 
of coefficient estimates on the variable of interest, M, that standard hypothesis 
tests do not reject. Levine and Renelt (1992) first chose a variable that has 
been the focus of past empirical studies, M, and ran a “base” regression that 
includes only the I-variables and the variable of interest. Then they compute the 
regression results for all possible linear combinations of up to three Z-variables 
and identify the highest and lowest values for the coefficient on the variable of 
interest, m , that cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level.(7) Thus, 
the extreme upper bound is defined by the group of Z-variables which produces 
Y= iI+ mM+ zZ+u
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the maximum value of m . The degree of confidence that one can have in the 
partial correlation between the Y and M variables can be inferred from the 
extreme bounds on the coefficient m.If m remains significant and have the 
same sign at the extreme bounds, then, we can refer to the result as “robust.” If 
the coefficient does not remain significant or if the coefficient changes sign, then 
one might feel less confident in the relationship between the M and Y variables, 
because alterations in the conditioning information set change the statistical 
inferences that one draws regarding the M-Y relationship. In this case, we can 
refer to the result as “fragile.” Furthermore, Levine and Renelt (1992) stipulated 
a specific number of variables included in I and Z variables. They only allow the 
procedure to choose up to four I-variables, and three Z-variables from the pool of 
variables identified as potentially important for explaining cross-country growth 
differentials. Consequently, Levine and Renelt (1992) restricted total number of 
explanatory variables in any one regression to be eight or fewer. Although we 
examine the sensitivity of the relationship between growth and more variables 
that were considered by any other study, we restrict the pool of variables to only 
seven. 
The data used are all annual data. All the growth rates of variables 
are calculated by differences in logarithms. The manufacturing GDP is 
used as a measure of aggregate output while the quantity of labor input is 
measured by the labor employed in manufacturing multiplied by average 
hours worked in manufacturing (i.e., man-hours worked). Manufacturing 
physical capital is acquired by deflating the nominal manufacturing capital of 
Pyo (1993) with 1990 constant GDP deflator during 1973-1990. Due to data 
unavailability, manufacturing investment is capitalized by using the program 
of CAPITAL in TSP software during 1991-1993. Both depreciation rate of 
capital and manufacturing operation rate are further considered in constructing 
manufacturing physical capital. We reformulate the compositions of I- and 
Z-variables of equation (4) in order to reflect the identification of Benhabib 
and Spiegel’s growth model and the characteristics of Korean economic 
growth. As described in equation (3), I- variables are composed by the ratio 
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of manufacturing investment to manufacturing GDP (MINV), high-school 
enrollment rate (HUM), catch-up term (CAT), and the growth of man-hours 
worked in manufacturing (LAB). The catch-up term is constructed by the 
multiple of HUM and the ratio of Korea’s per capita GDP relative to United 
States’ per capita GDP. Both of per capita GDP are nominal dollar base. The 
pool of Z-variables become the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (GOV), 
the ratio of government consolidated surplus or deficit to GDP (GDB), the 
inflation rate (PI), the growth rate of domestic credit (DCR), the ratio of total 
export to GDP (EX), the ratio of total import to GDP (IM), and the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to GDP (R&D). Full descriptions of macroeconomic indicators are 
described in the Appendix 1.
4. The Growth Mechanism and Human Capital of Korean Manufacturing
Before we investigate the fundamental sources of technological progress 
in Korean manufacturing,. we have to identify a growth mechanism (if existing) 
among the growth of manufacturing GDP per man-hours (GMH),  the growth 
of capital per labor (GKL), and technological progress (GTFP). The growth 
accounting method provides a better way to find the transition mechanism of 
GTFP effect on GMH. For this purpose, we perform both regression analysis and 
sensitivity analysis on GMH, GKL, GTFP (as dependent variables) in respect 
to the I-variables (as independent variables), respectively. This section will also 
clarify differences on the sources of GTFP, GKL, and GMH. 
Table 2 reports regression results of GKL and GTFP with I-variables over 
the 1974-1993. The estimated results are as follows.  
GKL= -0.109 + 0.064 HUM + 0.004 CAT + 0.245 INV –0.614LAB          (5)
                    (0.169)      (0.133)          (0.007)         (0.084)         (0.204)    
(R2 = 0.46, number of obsrvation=20, values in the parenthesis are
 standard errors).
GTFP= -0.304 + 0.269 HUM + 0.011 CAT + 0.051 INV –0.321 LAB        (6)
                     (0.133)     (0.105)            (0.005)        (0.066)         (0.161)    
(R2=0.46, number of obsrvation=20, values in the parenthesis are
14 15
 standard errors).
The I-variables explain half of the time-series variance both in the regressions 
of GKL and GTFP. The regression results of GKL with I-variables show that the 
coefficients of INV and LAB are significant over the 5 percent level in relation 
to GKL. While the coefficient of INV is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level, the coefficient of LAB is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. 
The regression results of GTFP with I-variables show something different from 
those of GKL. All three variables (HUM, CAT, and LAB) show significant 
over 10 percent level with GTFP. While the coefficient of LAB is negative and 
significant at 10 percent level, the coefficients of HUM and CAT show positive 
and significant at the 5 percent level with GTFP. However, the coefficient of INV 
is positive but not significant with GTFP. 
In the next step, we examine whether these findings are robust or fragile 
to changes in information set. Thus, we do a sensitivity analysis in order to 
investigate the robustness of I-variables in correlation with GKL and GTFP, 
respectively. Table 3 represents the sensitivity analyses for each I-variables with 
GKL. The coefficient of INV is robust and positive and that of LAB is robust 
and negative. The signs and significances of sensitivity analyses well coincide 
with those of regressions in Table 2. Table 4 represents the sensitivity analyses 
for I-variables with GTFP. The coefficients of HUM and CAT have positive and 
robust relationship with GTFP. However, that of LAB does not show robust 
correlation with GTFP. Thus, we can summarize that GKL has been associated 
robustly and positively with INV but negatively with LAB, and GTFP has been 
associated robustly and positively with HUM and CAT. 
In order to verify the growth mechanism existing among GMH, GKL, and 
GTFP, we perform both regression analysis and sensitivity analysis on GMH 
with I-variables. Table 2 presents regression results of GMH with I-variables: 
The regression results show 
GMH= -0.356 + 0.297 HUM + 0.014 CAT + 0.056 INV  –0.601 LAB        (7)
                    (0.168)      (0.132)           (0.006)          (0.084)        (0.203)    
(R2 =0.46, number of obsrvation=20, values in the parenthesis are
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 standard errors).
All I-variables become significant over 5 percent level with GMH. The estimated 
signs of I-variables are coincide well with the ones estimated in relation with 
GKL and GTFP: the coefficients of three variables (HUM, CAT, and INV) are 
positive but that of LAB is negative. Table 5 represents the sensitivity analyses 
for each of I-variables in relation with GMH in order to check the robustness 
of regression results. Each of I-variables shows robust relation with GMH. It is 
interesting that each robust variable in relation with GKL and GTFP becomes 
robust in relation with GMH. 
Considering all the results of regression and sensitivity analyses for each 
of I-variables with GMH, GKL, and GTFP, it is evident that there appears to 
be a growth mechanism among GMH, GKL and GTFP: both GKL and GTFP 
contribute to GMH by basic four variables but two different routes. One route is 
that investment share (INV) will give a positive effect on the labor productivity 
growth (GMH) by its positive effect on the growth of capital-labor ratio, 
while the growth of unskilled labor (LAB) will give a negative effect on labor 
productivity growth (GMH) by its effect on the growth of capital-labor ratio 
(GKL). The other is that both the level of human capital (HUM) and catch-up 
effect (CAT) will provide a positive effect on labor productivity growth by their 
positive effect on technological progress (GTFP). Therefore, investment share 
and the growth of unskilled labor do have a relationship with labor productivity 
growth by their effect on the growth of capital-labor ratio not by their effect 
on technological progress. In this context, Levine and Renelt (1992) also 
found the positive and robust relationship between the ratio of investment to 
GDP and the growth of per capita income based on the result of cross-country 
regression. However, they could not verify the existence of growth mechanism. 
Furthermore, we can infer the important economic implications about source 
of Korean manufacturing growth. As Benhabib and Spiegel (1993) interpreted, 
the positive effect of the level of human capital indicates that there exists the 
possibility of domestic innovation, and the positive catch-up effect indicates that 
there is the possibility of foreign technology inflow. Thus, technological progress 
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of Korean manufacturing may be possible by both the effects of domestic 
innovation and foreign technology inflow. 
There are also some criticisms on the use of secondary enrollment rate as 
a proxy of human capital.(8) Considering these criticisms, we re-estimate the 
relationship with GTFP and I-variables while we substitute other human capital 
proxies in the I-variables. The new proxies for human capital are the ratio of 
teacher per 10000 populations (TEM), the ratio of professional, technical and 
related workers to 1000 workers employed in all industry (AHC), and the ratio 
of teacher per student (TES).(9) At the same time, the catch-up term will also be 
reconstructed by using the different human capital proxy. The regression results 
in Table 6 indicate that the coefficients of catch-up term are all positive and 
significant in relation with GTFP. These results support the positive effect of 
catch-up terms on GTFP. However, none of the levels of human capital proxies 
shows positive and significant in relation with GTFP while HUM (high school 
enrolment rate) is still positive and significant. 
5. Summary and Conclusions
The main objective of this study is to find the growth mechanism of Korean 
manufacturing growth and the source of its technological progress during 
1974-1993. The growth accounting method was employed in order to calculate 
total factor productivity growth, which was used as technological progress. We 
used sensitivity analysis suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992) and employed 
a variety of all possible macroeconomic growth variables including R&D 
indicators. Firstly, we investigated the robustness of the four numbers of basic 
variables employed in the growth model of Benhabib and Spiegel (1995) in 
relation to technological progress: manufacturing investment shares, high school 
enrollment rate as a proxy of human capital (HUM), catch-up term, and labor 
input growth as a unskilled labor growth. Secondly, we examined the robustness 
of macroeconomic indicators with the technological progress. 
We summarize main results of this study as follows. First, technological 
progress has a robust and positive relationship with human capital and catch-up 
Catch-up, Human Capital, and Technological Growth in 
Korean Manufacturing
18 19
term. Second, the growth of capital-labor ratio has a robust and positive relation 
with investment shares and a robust and negative relationship with the growth 
unskilled labor. Third, labor productivity growth has a robust relationship 
with all four of basic variables: positive with human capital, catch-up term, 
investment shares, and negative with the growth of unskilled labor. 
Considering all the results of regressions and sensitivity analyses, it is 
evident that there appears to be a growth mechanism existing among labor 
productivity growth, the growth of capital-labor ratio, and technological 
progress. The growth of capital-labor ratio and technological progress contribute 
to labor productivity growth but by different route. While unskilled labor growth 
gives a negative effect on labor productivity growth by its effect the growth 
of capital-labor ratio, investment share will give a positive effect on labor 
productivity growth by its positive effect on the growth of capital-labor ratio. 
Both human capital and catch-up effect will provide a positive effect on labor 
productivity growth by their positive effect on technology progress. As Benhabib 
and Spiegel (1994) interpreted, the positive effect of the level of human capital 
indicates that there exists the possibility of domestic innovation, and that of the 
catch-up effect indicates that there is the possibility of foreign technology inflow. 
Thus, technological progress of Korean manufacturing seems to be possible 
by the effects of domestic innovation and foreign technology inflow. We may 
thus conclude that the fundamental sources of technological progress of Korean 
manufacturing appear to be investment share, human capital, and catch-up effect.
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Notes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
There is common recognition about convergence hypothesis: conditional convergence can 
be found among countries, however, absolute convergence cannot.
Fisher (1993) suggested that it would be necessary to undertake more detailed case studies 
of individual countries.
A cheabol in Korea is a group of firms owned and controlled primarily by a single 
entrepreneur and usually his family members. Sakong (1993) reported that top 46 cheabols’ 
share in GDP rose from 9.8 percent in 1973 to 17.1 percent in 1978. 
Hwang (1997) indicated that an outward oriented policy regime change in 1961 was not 
subject to the Lucas critique.
World Bank (1987) indicated that Korea’s trade regime was both “outward-looking on the 
export side and restrictive on the import side” during this period. 
Factor shares of α and β are employed by total employee compensation and operating 
surplus, respectively. Furthermore, annual data of factor shares are used in order to calculate 
annual total factor productivity growth. 
However, 10 percent significant level will be used by our sensitivity analysis in Section 4.  
School enrollment rate could be a proxy for the flow of investment in human capital rather 
than for stock [e.g., Barro (1991) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)]. Barro (1991) suggested 
another measures of human capital such as student-teacher ratio. 
AHC was used also a proxy of human capital in Hwang (1998). TEM includes all teachers 
and students in elementary school, middle school, high school, and university. 
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Table 3
Sensitivity Results for Basic Variables (Dependent Variable:
Growth of Physical Capital Per Man-hours, 1974-1993)
M-Variable
HUM
CAT
INV
LAB
 
High:-0.248
Base:0.064
Low:-0.389
High:0.014
Base:0.004
Low:0.007
High:0.315
Base:0.244
Low:0.157
High:-0.580
Base:-0.614
Low:-0.934
0.110
0.132
0.155
0.008
0.007
0.005
0.095
0.084
0.066
0.221
0.204
0.148
Standard
error
0.044
0.637
0.027
0.117
0.551
0.148
0.006
0.011
0.034
0.022
0.009
0.000
p-value R2β  
0.90
0.70
0.89
0.81
0.70
0.91
0.81
0.70
0.91
0.82
0.70
0.90
Other variables
PI, IM, GDB
PI, GOV, GDB
GDC, EX, R&D
PI, EX, R&D
GDC, EX, R&D
PI, GOV, IM
GDC, EX, GDB
PI, R&D, GDB
fragile
fragile
robust
robust
Robust/fragile
Notes: The base β is the estimated coefficient from the regressions with the variable of interest (M-
variable) and the always include variables (I-variables). The I-variables are INV, HUM, CAT, and 
LAB. The high β is the estimated coefficient from the regression with the extreme high bound; the 
low β is the coefficient from the regression with the extreme lower bound. The “other variables” 
are the Z-variables included in the base regressions that produce the extreme bounds. The 
robust/fragile designation indicates whether the variable of interest is robust or fragile.
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Table 4
Sensitivity Results for Basic Variables (Dependent Variable:
Total Factor Productivity Growth, 1974-1993)
M-Variable
HUM
CAT
INV
LAB
 
high:0.540
base:0.269
low:0.383
high:0.019
base:0.011
low:0.011
high:0.186
base:0.051
low:-0.019
high:-0.236
base:-0.321
low:-0.415
0.257
0.105
0.154
0.008
0.005
0.006
0.135
0.066
0.124
0.201
0.161
0.236
Standard
error
0.058
0.022
0.069
0.048
0.045
0.093
0.196
0.458
0.882
0.262
0.064
0.104
p-value R2β  
0.49
0.43
0.40
0.49
0.43
0.45
0.49
0.43
0.47
0.49
0.43
0.47
Other variables
EX, IM, R&D
PI, IM, GDB
EX, IM, R&D 
GOV, IM, GDB
EX, IM, R&D
GDC, GOV, GDB
EX, IM, R&D
GOV, EX, R&D
robust
robust
fragile
fragile
Robust/fragile
Notes: The base β is the estimated coefficient from the regressions with the variable of interest (M-
variable) and the always include variables (I-variables). The I-variables are INV, HUM, CAT, and 
LAB. The high β is the estimated coefficient from the regression with the extreme high bound; the 
low β is the coefficient from the regression with the extreme lower bound. The “other variables” 
are the Z-variables included in the base regressions that produce the extreme bounds. The 
robust/fragile designation indicates whether the variable of interest is robust or fragile.
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Table 5
Sensitivity Results for Basic Variables (Dependent Variable:
Growth of GDP per Man-hours, 1974-1993)
M-Variable
HUM
CAT
INV
LAB
 
High:0.469
Base:0.279
Low:0.362
High:0.021
Base:0.014
Low:0.013
High:0.213
Base:0.156
Low:0.187
High:-0.589
Base:-0.601
Low:-0.805
0.187
0.132
0.189
0.011
0.007
0.007
0.117
0.083
0.098
0.253
0.203
0.280
Standard
error
0.028
0.040
0.079
0.074
0.053
0.096
0.093
0.084
0.082
0.038
0.010
0.014
p-value R2β  
0.63
0.56
0.61
0.61
0.56
0.60
0.62
0.56
0.62
0.61
0.56
0.64
Other variables
EX, R&D, GDB
EX, IM, GDB
EX, IM, R&D
PI, IM, GDB 
PI, R&D, GDB
PI, EX, R&D
EX, IM, R&D
GDC, GOV, GDB
robust
robust
robust
robust
Robust/fragile
Notes: The base β is the estimated coefficient from the regressions with the variable of interest (M-
variable) and the always include variables (I-variables). The I-variables are INV, HUM, CAT, and 
LAB. The high β is the estimated coefficient from the regression with the extreme high bound; the 
low β is the coefficient from the regression with the extreme lower bound. The “other variables” 
are the Z-variables included in the base regressions that produce the extreme bounds. The 
robust/fragile designation indicates whether the variable of interest is robust or fragile.
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Table 6 
Regressions between TFP growth and Other Human Capital Proxies
Variable
INV
LAB
HUM
AHC
CATAHC
TEM
CATTEM
TES
CATTES
Obs.
R-squared
Eq.(1)
GTFP
    0.046 (0.073)
    -0.196 (0.155)
    0.175 (0.084)*
    -0.043 (0.136)
    0.032 (0.017)*
20
42
Eq.(2)
Dependent Variable
GTFP
0.044 (0.068)
 -0.286 (0.160)*
 0.289 (0.162)*
 -5.654 (10.864)
 1.237 (0.605)*
20
41
Eq.(3)
GTFP
0.033 (0.067)
-0.270 (0.158)
  0.279 (0.049)**
 -1.478 (1.499)
  0.289 (0.149)*
20
37
Notes: INV indicates the share of manufacturing investment to manufacturing GDP, LAB- the 
growth of labor inputs, HUM-high school enrollment rate, AHC-the ratio of professional, technical 
and related workers to 1000 workers in all industries, CATACH-AHC multiplied by increasing rate 
of Korean per capita with relation to USA per capita, TEM-the ratio of researcher per 1000 
populations, CATTEM-TEM multiplied by increasing rate of Korean per capita with relation to 
USA per capita, TES-the ratio of student per teacher, and CATTES-TES multiplied by the 
increasing rate of Korean per capita with relation to USA per capita. * and ** indicate significance 
level of 10 and 5 percents, respectively. 
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The Growth Mechanism of Korean Manufacturing
Labor Productivity Growth 
(GMH)
Growth of Capital-Labor Ratio
(GKL) 
Labor Growth
(LAB)
Catch-Up Term
(CAT)
Human Capital
(HUM)
Investment Share
(INV)
Technological Progress
 (GTFP)
Note: + (or -) means positive (or negative) effect on each growth rates. 
－
－
＋ ＋ ＋
＋ ＋ ＋
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INV
HUM
CAT
LAB
GOV 
GDB
PI
GDC
MIR
PGDP
UMP
WAGE
GM2
TINV
AGR
REX
FDB
MAF
EX
IM
TRSR
R&D
AHC
TEM
TES
The share of manufacturing investment in manufacturing GDP, 1990 constant value 
[Source: The Bank of Korea’s National Account, 1994)
High school enrollment rate [Source: National Statistical Office’s Major Statistics of 
Korean Economy, 1993, 1995) 
Catch up term processed by the product of HUM and the increasing rate of per capita 
Korean GDP from per capita US GDP. Per capita GDP is nominal value [Source: 
International Financial Statistical Yearbook, 1994).
Per man-hours growth rate of manufacturing [Source: National Statistical Office’s 
Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1993,1995)
The ratio of government expenditure to GDP, 1990 constant value [Source: The Bank 
of Korea’s National Account, 1994]
The ratio of consolidated budget deficit or surplus to GDP, nominal value [Source: 
National Statistical Office’s Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1995]
The consumer price increasing rate, 1990 constant price [Source: National Statistical 
Office’s Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1993, 1995]
The growth rate of domestic credit, [Source: National Statistical Office’s Major 
Statistics of Korean Economy, 1993, 1995]
Real interest rates: the averages of yields of guaranteed corporate bonds with maturity 3 
years minus PI. [Source: The Bank of Korea]
The growth rate of per capita GDP
Unemployment rate 
Real wage increasing rate
The growth rate of M2 [Source: The Bank of Korea’s The Statistics of Korea (written 
by Korean), 1995]
The ratio of total investment to GDP
The share of agricultural in GDP
The growth rate of real effective exchange rate 
The ratio of gross foreign liabilities to GDP, nominal value [Source: National Statistical 
Office’s Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1993, 1995]
The share of manufacturing in GDP
The ratio of gross export to GDP, nominal value [Source: The Bank of Korea’s National 
Account, 1994]
The ratio of gross import to GDP, nominal value [Source: The Bank of Korea’s National 
Account, 1994]
The ratio of trade surplus or deficit to GDP [Source: The Bank of Korea’s National 
Account, 1994]
The ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP [Source: Korea Industrial Technology 
Association’s Major Indicators of Industrial Technology, 1994, 1995]
The ratio of professional, technical and related workers to 1000 workers in all industries
The ratio of researcher per 1000 populations
The ratio of student per teacher  
Appendix 1
Variables and Sources
Variable                                         Definitions and Sources
Catch-up, Human Capital, and Technological Growth in 
Korean Manufacturing
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キャッチアップ、人的資本、技術進歩の韓国製造業に対する寄与
＜　要　約　＞
黄　仁相
　この研究の目的は、1974年から 1993年における韓国製造業の技術進歩の要因と成
長過程を特定することである。成長会計からの Solow残差が技術進歩率として計算さ
れた。この研究に使われた計量経済学的分析方法は Sensitivity分析方法である。主な
研究成果は、労働生産性成長率、資本 -労働比率成長率、そして技術進歩率との間に
ある成長プロセスが発見されたことである。すなわち、次のような二つのプロセスで
ある。投資 シェアは、資本・労働比率の成長率を変化させた、労働生産性成長に正
の影響を与えた。また、人的資本と Catch-up効果は、技術進歩率に正の影響を与え、
労働生産性成長に正の影響を与えたことである。これらの結果を踏まえて、韓国製造
業の技術進歩の要因は、人的資本と Catch-up効果であったように思われる。
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